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Maharashtra Land Development Corporation and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra and Anr.
NLS/ENVIS/11/11/2010/Forest Land/Supreme Court
Acquisition of Forest Land
Maharashtra Land Development Corporation and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra and Anr.
Supreme Court of India
Decided On: 11.11.2010
Hon'ble Judges: Mukundakam Sharma and Anil R. Dave, JJ.
NLS/ENVIS/11/11/2010/Forest/Supreme Court
The case pertains to acquisition of the Appellants land by the State of Maharashtra. The question before the court was whether the property in question fell within the meaning of ‘forest’ as envisaged in Section 2 (c-i) (ii) of the Maharashtra Private Forests (Acquisition) Act.
The Appellants argued that "forest land" in the light of the Forest Conservation Act, 1980, must be understood according to its literal, dictionary meaning, and must not be understood to include any area recorded as forest in the Government records irrespective of ownership. Further, it was contended that the provisions of the Forest Conservation Act, 1980 do not deal with the acquisition or vesting of 'privately owned land' or 'forest'.
The State submitted that in the proceedings initiated under Section 37 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code, and in the enquiry held in respect of the applicability of the Bombay Salsette Estate Abolition Act, 1951, it was found that the land in Survey No. 345(of which the land in question is a part) is a forest land. Evidence was adduced by the predecessor-in-interest of the appellant-Corporation, M/s. Veekaylal Investment Company, to the effect that Survey No. 345 was a 'jungle'. It was contended that the Company, at that time, took the stand that the land in question is a jungle with a view to prevent its vesting in the State Government under Section 4 of the Bombay Salsette Estate Abolition Act, 1951. It was argued that the successor-in-interest of M/s. Veekaylal Investment Company should not be allowed to take an opposite stand.
The State urged that the provisions of the Maharashtra Private Forest (Acquisition) Act, 1975 must be given an expansive interpretation in view of the fact that the Act was introduced to ameliorate grave concerns over the fact that private forests in Maharashtra had been severely depleted due to unregulated, unrestricted and excessive exploitation
The Supreme Court looked at whether on the appointed day under the Maharashtra Private (Acquisition) Forest Act, 1975, the Appellant’s land was ‘private forest’ or not. The Court held that definition of ‘forest’ as enunciated in Section 2 (c-i) (ii) of the Act specifically includes “land which is part of forest or lies within it or was part of forest or was lying within forest” on the appointed day under Act. A bare reading of the provision also indicates that the definition of 'forest' is an inclusive definition and therefore, it could have a wider connotation and it would not be appropriate to give it a restrictive meaning. Every word and phrase of the Act is to be understood in its context and must be given significance so that they are not rendered redundant.
The Acquisition proceedings were concluded in proximity to the appointed day in question, and the character of the land could not be said to have changed over such a relatively short period of time. It was also admitted by the Company through which the Appellant had derived title that land was forest land. The State also produced overwhelming documentary evidence and also contemporaneous evidence on record to prove and establish that the land was forest land.
The Court held that the very existence of land within a forest area would and could not change nature and character of forest land and that it would still continue to be treated as forest land. The fact that the area in question fell within the part designated as ‘forest’ on the appointed day was beyond any dispute and there was documentary evidence to buttress the same. By virtue of Section 2 (c-i) (ii) of Act, the portion in dispute would also be designated as “private forest” under Section 2(f) of Act.
The Court said that the Respondent State was only acting in accordance with the principles envisaged in the Act, which could not in any way said to be disproportionate or irrational just because they divest the Appellant Corporation of land. Quarrying operations conducted by Appellant Corporation in the said area, merit that State protects interests of general public by acquiring the land as private forest. The Appellant had failed to make out any case.